INTRODUCTION
Academics above all others should understand this need fo r in dependence and imagination [in judges]. vVhatever the curric ulum may say, we each run our classrooms to satisfy our individ ual visions. Thirty years is very nearly a career fo r many working people, or at least it was before age-discrimination legislation gave ordinary working people a taste of the security that the Constitution gives to Article III judges.3 It is thus a humbling thought that Jack Weinstein had distin guished careers as a teacher, scholar and law reformer before he took office (although, famously, neiLher ascended the bench nor donned the robe4), let alone that he also served as a soldier. Indeed, the use of the past tense in connection with any of Jack Weinstein's careers is questiona ble. Although a fe deral judge for the past thirty years, he has continued to teach, to write-has any trial judge in our history produced as many articles and books?-and to advocate and participate in the hard work of law reform.
The books and articles that Jack Weinstein has written, together with his opinions, provide what some might call a "paper trail." If only be cause that expression may be thought to imply a destination , I prefer to see Weinstein's extrajudicial writings as windows into his mind, helping us better understand his judicial behavior, only fr agments of which are preserved in published opinions. 5
In a brief comment on one of Judge Weinstein's articles celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,6 I noted that " [ o] ne hears much these days about the independence of the fe deral judiciary ... [but] less about the independence of individual fe deral judges," and I voiced a suspicion that 'Judge Weinstein's years in (1949) . But see Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 121 ( 1995) ("The republican simplicity of manners-the 'I'm no better than the next guy' deportment-that most American judges affect is intended to be admired rather than to be taken seriously. Judges receive deference because they have power, and the power resides in their votes.") ; Linda S. Nlullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litiga tion: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 59 1 (1994) ("As fo r me, I preferjudges in their robes, and on the bench.").
5. Most of judge Weinstein'sjudicial behavior is not captured in opinions. See Letter from Jack B. Weinstein to Stephen B. Burbank (June 11, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (" [M] ost of [my favorite procedural decisions] are oral. ... They are almost never transcribed unless an appeal is taken, which occurs only infrequently.") . Such is generally the case with trial judges. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 4, at 222-24; Posner, supra note 4, at 112-14. Moreover, because of both the rhetorical fu nction of opinions and publication practices that are neither comprehensive nor scientific, published opinions may give a distorted picture of the legal landscape. See Frank, supra note 4, at 165-85; Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925 Rev. , 1955 Rev. -56 (1989 6. See Jack B. academe contributed more than deep learning to his career as ajudge."7 I also observed th at his article "demonstrate [ d] both the powerful vision of justice that has marked his career as a judge and the practical vision of politics that has marked his career as a scholar," but I questioned "whether the Judge has succeeded in reconciling those visions."8
This Festschrift provides a welcome opportunity to pursue fu rther the suggestion that Jack Weinstein's notions of judicial independence and of the judicial role have been shaped in part by, but are not always in harmony with, his experience and knowledge as an academic. The view I take through the windows opened by his writings is that an important part of Weinstein the judge is Weinstein the law professor. I therefore consider his work as a whole with an eye to continuities and discontinui ties between the roles of professor and fe deral judge. I am prim arily in terested in the first of the two desiderata in a judge that Weinstein him self identified and associated with academic life-independenceY I then briefly take up the quality that he linked with independence-imagina tion 10-and a third quality that may be at war with independence, if not with imagination-ideology.
When seeking to draw infe rences fr om the written record of the past, it is important to take account of the passage of time, the effe cts of both experience and role on substance, 11 and the rhetorical demands of a par ticular role. In Jack Weinstein's case, that is only to say that the record is as complex as the man, which is reason enough to resist labels of the sort that recurrently debase public discourse about the fe deral judiciary. It is also reason enough not to draw too much fr om what is after all only a part, even if an important part, of a full and active life.
Still, in seeking to delineate some of the influences that have contrib uted to Weinstein's judicial behavior, I hope also to suggest some general lessons about independence and accountability in a trial judge, about ju dicial imagination, and about ideology. These are complex and difficult matters. Attempting to come to grips with them is critically important at a time when judges both state and fe deral are attacked, and in some juris dictions may lose their offices, because of the decisions they make.
Mindfu l of Judge Weinstein's observation that " [p] roceduralists are often hot-blooded as well as long-wi nded,"12 I shall attempt to be neither.
I shall also attempt to avoid the "absurd ... notion that, because one finds fa ult in some ideas of men of genius, he should disregard all the rest."1� I recognize how difficult it is to be a judge today, particularly a fe deral judge with Jack Weinstein's personality, life experiences, and be lief structure. If I pause over certain aspects of his judicial behavior that I find problematic, it is to honor our shared commitment to the pursuit of knowledge. None of us would want to be emulated in every facet of our professional lives. All of us would be better off if more fe deral judges emulated more facets of Jack Weinstein's professional life.
I. INDEPENDENCE Al"'D AccouNTABILITY
In a mass tort case, ajudge's fa ilure to appreciate the reach and importance of his or her decisions is tantamount to abdica tion of responsibility. Much as the President steers the ship of state at the head of the executive branch, each fe deral trial judge, with respect to each case that comes before him or her, stands watch over the judicial branch. The trial judge is in most cases th e final arbiter. If the trial judge fa ils to respond to the needs of the public, th e only recourse is to appellate judges who are narrowly confined in matters of fa ct and who are usually in a less favorable position than the nisi prius judge to understand the fu ll scope of a litigation. A rigid and unresponsive judiciary, blind to the needs of various communities and of society at large, is far more likely to cause an erosion of public confidence in legal institutions than a judiciary perceived as overly inter ested in resolving problems before it. 1 4
No doubt it expands the ego of a judge to look upon himself as the guardian of the general fu ture. But his more humble yet more important and immediate task is to decide individual, ac tual, present cases .... Such judicial legislation as inheres in fo rmulating legal rules is inescapable. But courts should be modest in their legislative efforts to control the fu ture .... The fu ture can become as perniciously tyrannical as the past. Posterity-worship can be as bad as ancestor-worship. ' " Jack We instein brought to the bench an attitude towards indepen dence that was shaped by his experience as an academic. Academic fr ee dom and judicial independence are alike in some respects, including the fa ct that they exist to protect institutions. They also diffe r in critical re spects. Whereas intellectual autonomy is central to the integrity of the academic enterprise, it can be inimical to the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary in a democracy. Jack Weinstein's writings-his opinions and particularly his books and articles-are a rich repository fo r the consider ation of issues that are at the crossroads of judicial independence and 13. Frank, supra note 4, at viii . 14. Weinstein 
INDEPENDENCE, IMA GINATION AND IDEOLOGY
1975 accountability. Study of those writings suggests to me that Judge Weinstein is too much Professor Weinstein. I find evidence in his judicial and extramural work of insufficient attention to institutional (as opposed to individual) independence and, as a corollary, to the idea of, or mecha nisms fo r ensuring, accountability. But those are my conclusions, and I reach them having enormous respect fo r Judge Weinstein's struggle with the "insoluble dilemma" of preservi ng legitimacy, while seeking to honor the "dominant needs and aspirations" of the times. 16
A. Academic Freedom and Judicial In dependence Jack Weinstein fo rged his credentials and reputation as an academic in a world where professors er-Uoyed substantial freedom to teach and write what they chose, and where the tenure system provided structural protection fo r their intellectual independence. 1 7 By the 1960s, in any American institution of higher learning worthy of the name, an attempt to dictate the content of teaching or writing would have been resisted fiercely and probably successfully. For in the absence of explicit contrac tual language, American courts were likely to order the parties' relations in accordance with the normative stance worked out when the state sought to control the academic enterprise:
The essentiality of fr eedom in the community of American uni versities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intel lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the fu ture of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. The court must preserve its legitimacy and the ideal of law by invoking a ma jestic sense of continuity. At the same time, the law must coincide with the dominant needs and aspirations of iL� times. The dilemma is insoluble .... The judge who persistently confuses law with his or her personal values also invites attacks upon judicial independence. In short, the risk to the independence of the courts is the politicization of the judiciary. It can be created on either side. There have been strains on the tenure system in recent years, the most troublesome of which have involved speech codes and attacks in the name of productivity. 1 9 In each case, a rallying cry fo r change has been the need fo r accountability.
Tenured American professors are not only independent, but also largely unaccountable. It is true that professors must publish in order to qualify fo r tenure, and they may be responsive to peer pressure . Ye t, once they have tenure, they may safely prefer the reflected glow of institu tional glory to the court of scholarly opinion.�0 Or at least they may do so if their salary, space and other similar perquisites are not dependent on the ability to secure grants. That is to say, the tenure system is generally thought to confer on professors much the same protection against dimi nution of compensation that Article III confers on fe deral judges. � 1 Among academics, law professors have long been, and they remain, singularly insulated from accountability.22 Once law professors have ten ure,�3 if they run out of ideas or fo r other reasons choose not to publish, Unlike fe deral judges, professors need not worry that their unpublished projects will appear on a list after three years. The Civil Justice Reform Act of l 990 ( CJ RA) requires the preparation of a semiannual report, available to the public, "that discloses for each judicial officer . . the number and names of cases that have not been terminated within three years after filing." See 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995). In its evaluation of experience under the CJRA, RAl'JD 's Institute for Civil Justice found that after the requirement went into effect, and although "the number of all civil cases pending ... increased, ... the number of cases pending over three years ... dropped by about 25 percent from its pre-CJRA level." James S. Kakalik, et a!., An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act xxx ( 1996) .
21. See American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement Of Principles On Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, at 407, 407 ("a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability"); Letter from Robert A. Gorman, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Stephen B. Burbank (March 6, 1 997) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (contending that "[t] enure would be an inadequate protection for independent and controversial speech by academicians if salary could be whittled away as a reprisal").
22. Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 112 ("It is the unique insulation of federal appellate judges from accountability that makes their behavior such a challenge to the economic analysis of law, and more broadly to the universalist claims of the economic th eory of human behavior." (footnote omitted) ).
23. In the old days it did not take much writing (or perhaps any) to secure tenure. Now, more is expected in that regard, but the absence of a community of scholars with shared interests (or values)-of a discipline of academic law-renders suspect both premises of "peer review." For a discussion of the importance of disciplines and the cost of salary increases fo regone can be more than covered by con sulting fe es. And if they do choose to publish, whether or not they have run out of ideas, peer review will not usually get in their way.
If Judge Weinstein were still only a professor, it might be that, as a doctrinalist, he would be fo rced to confront "the epistemic shallowness of the enterprise."24 But he has never been only a doctrinalist.25 More im portant, no law professor, or at least none who is really interested in law, need be "only a professor." As there are numerous opportunities to sup plement academic compensation, so are there opportunities to build rep utation and popularity among groups fa r more numerous and powerful than the professoriate.26 The classroom remains a good place to start.27
It may be harder to remove a fe deral judge fr om office for miscon duct than to fire a tenured university professor,28 but that is a small point at which to stick. Notwithstanding storm clouds on the academic hori zon, it is difficult to conclude that judges enjoy greater independence than professors. This is as it should be, because there are important dif- Our academics and ethicists seem to prefer library research to field research. This preference is understandable since field work is so time consuming and expensive, but lack of it may lead to academic commentary having little relation to the real world. Should law professors have ethical obligations to resist becoming insulated and detached from the day-to-day realities of litigation and to produce work that can be better utilized by the public and the courts? Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 4, at 274 n.34.
In the view of one scholar/critic, Judge Weinstein has not been immune to academic fads. See Mullenix, supra note 4, at 583, 585 & n.18.
26. In contrast, the opportunities for federal judges to supplement their incomes and to engage in extramural activities that could serve as alternative sources of reputation are seriously constrained. See Posner, supra note 4, at 137-38; Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time fo r a National Commission on Judicial Independence and Accountabilitv?, 73 Judicature 176, 177 (1990) .
27. Law schools serve a profession. Some students become leaders of the bar, others judges, and still others politicians. As a result, not many institutions can afford to tolerate the neglect of teaching and of students that is sometimes, perhaps unfairly, associated with the liberal arts tradition and that some see as unfortunate baggage of law's interdisciplinary voyage.
28. See Posner, supra note 4, at 111 (suggesting that "pretty much the only thing that will get [an Article III judge] removed is criminal activity.") . There is reason to doubt, however, whether in these days the "high hurdle" to removal of an Article III judge that Judge Posner refers to-which must be that of transaction costs-would protect judges engaging in some of the behavior he enumerates. See id. (mistreating staff; leaking confidential information to the press) .
ferences in the functions of independence and accountability in the two worlds. However, the relationship betwe en individual freedom and inde pendence seems not to be such a difference. Both the individual judge and the individual professor are protected so that an institution may flourish .
Academic freedom is linked to the birth of the modern university in nineteenth-century Germany.29 In this country, the notion was promoted to advance "not the absolute freedom of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, of th e academic profession."30 Federal judicial independence is also first and foremost an institu tional value, designed to protect th e separation of powers and the rule of law.31 Article III of the Constitution vests judicial power in courts, not judges.32 Remembering that lower federal court judges owe the exist ence of their positions to congressional rather than constitutional choices should help focus attention on the institutional goals that service during good behavior and the guarantee of undiminished compensation were meant to further.:�3 33. It may be useful for certain purposes to distinguish between the institutional independence of the judiciary and the independence of an individual judge, as when federal judges impose discipline on a colleague. Yet, even when there is conflict wi thin the judiciary that implicates judicial independence, the ultimate values to be served are those that preserve and protect th e judicial branch as an institution. In other words, the protection of the institution may on occasion require vindicating the position of an individual judge who is in conflict with the institution's leadership fo r the time being.
Academic freedom and accountability are in tension only to the ex tent th at the latter threatens the "right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs."34 Although an assistant professor ex periences the "double-edged way" in which academic freedom operates,35 a tenured professor should be intellectually autonomous% and in that sense unaccountable.'�' Judicial independence and accountability may also be in tension, but not for the same reasons. Independence requires that judges be able to decide cases, find facts and say what the law is, free of both public pres sure and private blandishment. Ye t, acknowledging the need for law, in cluding the law made by judges, to evolve with the society it serves, it is not the role of judges of inferior federal courts freely to "modify or reject [those] traditional ideas and beliefs"3 8 that are captured in rules we call Burbank, supra note 31, at 1 17; see also Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Judicial Discipline and Removal 9-1 7 (1993) [hereinafter National Commission Report] (discussing constitutional issues affecting federal judicial independence and accountability) . 35. Menand, supra note 23, at 9 (" [N] o one who is an assistan t professor coming up for tenure is likely to feel a strong association between the experience and the concept of intellectual freedom.").
36. Academic freedom does not, however, give any professor the right to be institutionally autonomous, as by refusing to teach courses reasonably assigned, to sef\·e on fa culty committees, and the like. Such behavior is not grounds for removal of tenure unless egregious, to be sure, but there are other instruments of accountability, such as denial of a salary increase. The problem in contemporary law schools is that such measures may not be effective.
37. This is not to deny "the immensity of the intellectual debt each of us owes to the disciplinary matrix within which we work." Haskell, supra note 30, at 76. Nor is it to deny that the parents of academic freedom in this country-those who wrote the 1915 AAUP Report, supra note 30-"associated the right of academic freedom with a duty on the part of the academic profession to police its ranks and rigorously uphold standards." Haskell, supra note 30, at 57; see also id. at 60 (discussing necessity of peer review, conducted by professors rather than trustees or administrators). Nor still is it to deny that such remains a worthwhile goal today. See id. at 67 (" [T] he community of the competent cannot do iL'; work of cultivating and authorizing sound opinion unless its members confront one another and engage in mutual criticism.'') . It is, however, to assert that policing is more difficult in a world of fragmenting and disintegrating academic disciplines, and that it is precisely in such a world that tenured professors are most likely to insist upon their autonomy. law. Stare decisis may not enshrine "immutable doctrine,"39 but neither may a federal trial judge be intellectually autonomous.
The stakes are different as well. As a result, although academic free dom only sporadically raises accountability issues,40 accountability is now and always will be central to the independence of the judiciary.41 Contin uing public acceptance of a life tenured judiciary-its legitimacy in a de mocracy-depends upon continuing faith in the means by which judges are held accountable fo r their decisions.
B. judicial Accountability
We sh ould not fo rget that Justice Samuel Chase only narrowly es caped removal from office fo r partisan judicial behavior in 1805 or that, if the Senate had convicted him, the impeachment process might have be come an acceptable instrument of policing unpopular judicial deci sions.42 That it is not so regarded is rightly a cause of satisfaction.43 But it is no more an occasion fo r complacency than is the unacceptability of court-packing plans after President Franklin Roosevelt's failed effort in 1937, which, as I have noted elsewhere, "shar [es] with the trial ofJustice Chase status as a defining moment in the history of fe deral judicial inde pendence."44 To the contrary, having resolved to fo rswear blunt instru ments to hold our judges accountable fo r their decisions, we have a greater interest in ensuring the adequacy of the tools that remain.
As suggested above, the rule of law is a potentially powerful norm of accountability that, wh en applied to the lawmaking of judges, requires fidelity to the past. In that aspect the rule of law ideal reflects the view that, in order to have a government of laws and not men, the judiciary must either fo llow or explain departures from precedent, "applying a 39. ld.
40. I happen to believe that academic freedom is important to the wellbeing of American society, but not eve n ra nk self-interest could cause me to equate its importance with the preset\'ation of federal judicial independence. Speech codes are a transient phenomenon; the quest for greater productivity may last longer, but, except as part of an attack on the tenure system. it poses only an indirect threat to academic freedom.
41. A� the National Commission [on Judicial Discipline and Removal] recognized, these concepts need not and should not be at war with one another. The Constitution provides for both as part of the system of checks and balances. It should be impossible, except perhaps for a lawyer, to think about one without thinking about the other. Both tend to ensure the respect and confidence necessary to the effectiveness of the fe deral judiciary in our representative democracy. Neither alone would do so.
Burbank, supra note 31, at 118; see also National Commission Report, supra note 33, at 1-26. 44. Burbank, supra note 31, at 120. continuity of inherited legal principles, even though it strives to cater to the dominant needs of its times."45 Whatever comfort one may take fr om the shared backgrounds , edu cational and professional experiences, and socialization of fe deral judges,46 the rule of law is not self-enforcing. Moreover, it is not a norm that obviously fosters accountability in much of the work of those courts that "are the heart of court-house government,"47 the trial courts. Finally, trial courts lack the safety of numbers-they lack both the greater capac ity of a plural court to ensure conform ity and also the availability of the dissenting opinion to express nonconformity.48
The common law tradition of public access to court proceedings is another means by which courts are made accountable and the legitimacy of the judiciary is preserved. The protection it affo rds is perhaps most important at the trial court level, where first instance decisions are made, many of which are effectively the final-although often not published word.49 In the Age of Settlement, when compromises extend to tradi tional litigation values, public access may be thought expendable.50
Thus, at the end of the day, th e most important warrant of accounta bility fo r the decisions of most fe deral judges-other than their own pro fe ssional self-discipline-is the realistic prospect of appellate review. judges serve "under a potent system of governmental controls."53 Almost fifty years later, the prospect of appellate review is rarely realistic, and there is reason fo r concern about the quality of review when it occurs.54 Through a combination of moves-some small, some big, some whose consequences were intended,55 some unintended5 6 -we have created a situation in which trial courts wield tremendous power and only with dif ficulty can be held accountable fo r their decisions. We may have put fe d eral judicial independence at risk by depriving ourselves of the main structural check against abuse of power at the trial level.
C. Independence and Accountability in the Wo rk of Jack Wei nstein
As a judge, Jack Weinstein has been "true to an inner core of respon sibility" and thus has been willing "sometimes [to] risk, or even court, reversal to make certain that the appellate courts, the bar, academia and the public are fu lly aware that there is a strong opposing moral view."57 From the unanswerable opinion Judge Weinstein wrote (on remand) demonstrating why Rule 11 sanctions ordered by the Court of Appeals were inappropriate,5 8 to his opinions protesting the dehumanizing ef-53. Cohen, supra note 32, at 843; see also Frank, supra note 4, at 148-55 (discussing social, economic, political and professional influences on trial judges, especially as compared with appellate judges) . fe cts of sentencing guidelines, 59 he has used his powerfu l mind and seem ingly inexhaustible energy to advocate his interpretations of existing laws and, where reinterpretation was not possible, to advocate fo r change.
Surely, this is the type of fe deral judge we should want, whatever our political views. Dilemmas have two horns, and the rule of law ideal can not require us always to stick on one of them.6 0 To that extent we should agree with Judge Weinstein that "[r] isk-fo r-risk, ... a thinking, informed judge is fa r less dangerous than one pickled in his own, ever-so-ethical views."6 1 And that is a very considerable extent, because it concedes to a fe deral trial judge the freedom (if not assigning the responsibility) to question and criticize laws, whether statutory or judge made, that are un just or perhaps simply fo olish.
Agreement with these sentiments of Judge Weinstein also requires that we be willing to tolerate occasional open refusals by a trial judge to fo llow the law as it is generally understood. 62 This is a highly controver sial proposition that requires elaboration. I refer to "occasional" refusals fo r both practical and normative reasons. Practically, it is a rare legal rule that admits of no doubt and hence of no room fo r maneuvering around an unjust or nonsensical result. As Judge Weinstein has observed, " [t] here are many techniques used by our courts to avoid and circumvent dubious and immoral precedents."63 Normatively, frequentjudicial diso bedience by trial judges would exhaust courts of appeals. Far more im portant, it could precipitate a constitutional crisis in which judicial inde pendence would be the loser. 62. It may be important to distinguish between settled doctrine and a rule or interpretation recently announced by a court of appeals. In the Eastway case, Judge We instein and the Court of Appeals were disputing the proper interpretation of a recently amended (1983) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and one, moreover, that seemingly conferred discretion on the trial judge as to the choice of a sanction. See Eastwa y , 637 F. Supp. at 566-69, 584; supra note '(-.7 and accompanying text. More than just Judge Weinstein's evidently superior understanding of the relevant legal landscape in that case inclines me to the view that, in general, district judges should have greater freedom to insist that courts of appeals really mean what they say about a new law. Particularly when Supreme Court review is only a theoretical possibility, dialogue benveen th e courts of appeals and the district courts is important for legal development.
63. Weinstein, Nazis, supra note 57, at 1155; see also id. at 1156 ("Precedent can be distinguished on many grounds as, for example, by characterizing the 'rule' as dictum, and by finding parallel lines of authority."); Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions-Some Views on Participation, 13 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 231, 233 (1980) Uurisdictional and related concepts may appear to be inflexible but "sometimes they are soft around the edges and can be adjusted to achieve a sensible substantive result").
I refer to "open refusals" because I expect a trial judge to be candid about, and take responsibility fo r, the nature and extent, as well as the impact in a particular case, of a departure fr om the law as generally un derstood. For, as Professor Weinstein recognized, "there is no one but his fe llow judges wh o can stop him when he proposes to stray beyond those 'limits which precedent and custom and the long silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges ... have set to judgemade innova tions.' "6 4 Moreover, as Judge Weinstein has observed in an article urging the importance of judicial review of administrative action, "our public hearings and written opinions ... keep the system honest. ... This is one of our most important protections against injustice and abuse of power."6· " Judge We instein was apparently not talking about the "system" in which he works, but his point is equally valid as applied to "a com pletely independent judiciary. " 66
We do not need Judge Posner to tell us that "UJ udges don't like to be reversed," and his chosen fo cus on appellate judges colors the asser tion that "aversion to reversal does not bulk large in the judicial utility fu nction."67 The willingness openly to "risk, or even court, reversal,'' 6 8 is, however, what separates that which I have provocatively called 'judicial disobedience" fr om judicial nullification.
If one agrees with this assessment, certain aspects of the judicial work of Jack We instein may cause concern fr om the perspective of judicial in dependence and accountability. Befo re turning to these concerns, it bears repeating that, taken as a whole, Judge Weinstein's work represents the finest traditions of an independent fe deral judiciary. To read his 1984 article on social security disability cases, fo r example, is to share a record of judicial courage and determination, one that not only bore fr uit fo r individual litigants who had the good fo rtune to end up in Judge Weinstein's courtroom, but also resulted in a change in national policy through sustained criticism. 6 9 64. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation, supra note 25, at 837 (omission m original) (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 103 (1921) There is no doubt that Jack Weinstein has shown himself to be the sort of judge that Professor Weinstein encouraged our system to seek in its judicial appointments: "mature [individuals] ... who understand inti mately legal problems in their social and economic contexts, and who have the assurance to be both generous and courageous. "70
The three possible problems I see in Judge Weinstein's work from this perspective relate to ( 1) standards by which he determines not to fo llow the law as it is generally understood, (2) fa ilure to take responsibil ity fo r some of his departures from those laws, and (3) lack of respect fo r accountability within the judiciary.
1. Standm·ds fo r judicial Disobedience. -:A ssuming that our system can tolerate occasional open refusals by trial judges to follow the law as it is generally understood (or that occasional open refusals may be essential to the system's health) , fr equent instances ofjudicial disobedience would present grave practical and normative problems. For this reason, there is an obvious need fo r limiting principles or standards to guide and restrain judges in choosing the occasions fo r disobedience.
Judge Weinstein recognized the problem in a discussion of jury nulli fication. Although claiming that "[t]he heritage of refusing to obey laws regarded as unjust in their operation is honored today within all branches of the fe deral government, often fo r the 'good of the Republic,"'71 Judge Weinstein acknowledged that "[t]he difficulty with any tendency to ignore laws is that whether a particular law is unjust may depend entirely on the view of the beholder."72 In the context of jury nullification, he took comfort from "procedural safeguards and require ments of group decisionmaking."73 Similar safeguards may not be avail able, and there is no such general requirement, fo r the work of fe deral trial judges. 74 Wh at, then, are the standards that guide Judge Weinstein when he refuses to fo llow the law as it is generally understood? We may safe ly infe r that he is one of those district judges who "have been known to nullify wh en, fo r example, they seek to escape the rigors of guideline sentencing or when the outcome of a trial totally offe nds their sense of justice."75 Nor do I think it unreasonable to include him among those judges who occasionally "stretch the law to some extent out of sympathy fo r the liti gants and a sense of justice. "76
The principle or standard fo r judicial disobedience emerging from Judge We instein' s extramural writings is not much of a limitation, to the extent that it turns on the individual judge's desire fo r flexibility, sympa th ies or "sense ofjustice."77 Judge Weinstein believes that "[e]ach Ameri can judge is individually beholden to the people and our conscience through th e Constitution,"78 and that "a previously enunciated rule can not, and should not, prevent an individual American judge from follow ing the Constitution and what he or she considers its moral impera tives."79 It may be a long way from the Constitution to its moral imperatives and further still to an individual judge 's sense ofjustice, par- Note that the examples of "stretching" Judge Weinstein gave in the article quoted in the text-"landlord-tenant disputes or evictions fo r mortgage defaults"-are not exactly the staple of fe deral district judges. Weinstein, Jury Nullification, supra note 71, at 246.
77. \IV einstein, Jut-y Nullification, supra note 71, at 246; see also Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 4, at 171 ("some fe lt sense of appropriateness"); Weinstein, Social Security Disability Cases, supra note 65, at 899-900 ("almost certain intuition, based on ... knowledge of the law and life, that an injustice has been done") .
78. \! \'einstein, Nazis, supra note 57, at 1154; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power of th e Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120 F.R.D. 267, 285 (1988) [hereinafter Weinstein, Limited Power to Reassign) ("One of th e great strengths of the federal judicial system has been the strong sense of independent power and responsibility of each fe deral judge to protect the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
79. We instein, Nazis, supra note 57, at 1156. I have sought to keep separate, and it may be significant that Judge Weinstein apparently does not distinguish between, refusal to fo llow the law as it is generally understood-what I have called 'judicial disobedience"-and nullifica tion.8 1 The value of the distinction, if any, lies in the existence of an institutional check on fidelity to the law in one case and the lack of any such check in the other.
According to this view, the jury in a criminal case engages in nullifi cation if its acquittal results from refusal to fo llow the trialjudge's instruc tions as to the governing law or if it consciously distorts the facts so as to avoid the reach of the law it has been given. But a fe deral trial judge commits a qualitatively different act if he or she refuses to follow the law as it is generally understood, so long as it is done openly and so long as there is a realistic prospect of appellate review. Judicial disobedience, in other words, entails willingness to pay the price of reversal.82
A'> previously discussed, it is hard to maintain that appellate review still provides effe ctive structural assurance of judicial accountability.83 Not only have we abandoned a key check on the equitable discretion of fe deral trial judges by restricting interlocutory appeals, 8 4 but we have broadened th e domain of their discretion as to fa cts.w' Perhaps even more important, we have opened vast new vistas fo r the exercise of unre viewable discretion, and hence of power, by permitting, indeed encourag ing, trial judges to become actively involved in settlement.86
Much has been written about the Agent Orange litigation, in which Vietnam veterans sued chemical manufacturers, claiming that the herbi cide by which the litigation is known caused a host of diseases and condi tions from which they suffered. Peter Schuck's book/'7 together with Richard Marcus's review essay,88 prompt numerous questions about Judge Weinstein's handling of the litigation, howsoever much one may admire the imagination and determination with which he obtained fo r the plaintiffs a settlement providing money and other benefits to which they were not entitled under the existing substantive law.89 Judge Weinstein's opinions on choice of law90 and governmental im munity91 also cause concern. Professor Schuck has aptly described the choice of law opinion, in which Judge Weinstein conjured up a "federal or a national consensus law of manufacturer's liability, government con tract defense and punitive damages,"92 as a combination of "prestidigita tion and rank insubordination,"93 but he has also ventured that it was "redeemed only by the manifest wisdom and fairness of his position."94 With respect-to both Judge Weinstein and Professor Schuck-! cannot agree. For, as Professor Schuck also notes, Judge Weinstein did his best to insulate his "insubordination" fr om judicial review.95 The same was The opinion partook of "prestidigitation" because it eliminated the choice of law problems that would have made class certification impossible under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by assuming a "national consensus law" that sirnply did not exist.
Conjure as he might, no "national consensus law" existed on these issues. Significantly, he neither cited a case establishing that it did exist nor said what the content of that law was or even how one might go about divining it. That, he coyly observed, was "a subject for another memorandum"; his own opinion was merely "preliminary" and "provisional," "a first general guide to the parties of the court's present thinking," one that was always "subject to refinement and change." true of his governmental immunity opinion.96 The strategy worked;97 the case was settled, and Judge Weinstein's individual vision of justice was served.
It is not clear, however, that the system of justice was well served. It is no secret that trial judges may wish to insulate their decisions from rever sal on appeal and that there are many ways in which they may try to do so. If we are permitted to make normative judgments about such practices, rather than simply accept them as part of a utility fu nction,98 we should perhaps draw some distinctions. We may, fo r instance, be more comfort able wi th a trial judge who takes self-protective action out of concern that all of the time and effo rt devoted to a trial will be wasted because of a disagreement about the admissibility of an item of evidence, or that the appellate court cannot accurately grasp the fa cts from the cold record, than we are with a situation like A gent Orange. If so, the reason is proba bly fo und in the judge's attitude toward, and effo rts to abide by, the gov erning law.
In Agent Orange Judge Weinstein, pursuing the goal of settlement, applied what he knew was not generally understood as the law, and did everything he could to make sure that the train he was conducting was not derailed by the Court of Appeals. 9 9 That is not a refusal; it is an evasion. It is not judicial disobedience, but nullification: the act of a "completely independent" judge who has sought to make the rest of the judiciary irrelevan t and any protecti on against "abuse of power" 100 impos-96. Professor Schuck described how Judge Weinstein shielded the decision from review:
Noting once again that his opinion was only "preliminary" and "tentative," designed merely to "assist the parties in preparing fo r trial," he closed by inviting the gO\·ernment to "renew its motion to dismiss at any time." This invitation, however, could not have been seriously intended. Indeed, when the government shortly thereafter and on several occasions asked Weinstein to reconsider or certify an immediate appeal on the issue, he summarily rejected the request; the gO\ ·ernment, he insisted, must stand trial on May 7, only two months hence, unless a higher court intervened. Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
97. The government sought and was denied mandamus, and its appeal was dismissed as premature. See In re ''Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp sible. In this respect th e Agent Orange litigation seems a far cry from the tort system Judge Weinstein once described and, notwi th standing its de fe cts, compared favorably with administrative systems because it was "out in the open and independent of government abuse."101
Agent Orange was a rare and unusual case, and one's reaction to its irregulari ti es may be colored by Judge Weinstein's accomplishment, not just in securing money fo r Vietnam veterans who were in need, but in creating a structure that has produced benefits fa r beyond the dollars paid by defendantsYl2 ButJudge Weinstein has not confined techniques that raise troublesome independence and accountability issues to Agent Oran g e.
It is perhaps more difficult to accept that Judge Weinstein's ends justified his means when, in more ordinary litigation, he required a cor porate defendant (one among many) to defend a lawsuit on a theory of personal jurisdiction radically at odds with Supreme Court precedent, knowing that appellate review was unlikely and that the case would proba bly settle.103 The theory was the stuff of a law review article-a creative one at that. 104 It was (or would have been if the defendant had settled) consequential not because it won acceptance in th e marketplace of ideas, nor because it survived the gauntlet of appellate review, but as a result of something that looks uncomfortably like brute fo rce.
As Felix Cohen observed, the "decision th at is 'peculiar' suffe rs ero sion-unless it represents the first salient manifestation of a new social fo rce, in which case it soon ceases to be peculiar." 1 05 At times Judge Weinstein seems to want to have his cake and eat it too: to be able to effe ct progressive change in the law through th e intellectual fo rce of his opinions without paying the price of (perhaps only temporary) rebuff 101. We instein, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 4, at 169.
See id. at 104-06.
103. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993). The case did settle, but the defendant kept in, the successor to a California manufacturer of DES, refused to participate and secured a dismissal fo r vva nt of prosecution when the plaintiff declined to present evidence. Thereafter, an attempt to take an appeal from Judge Weinstein's order on jurisdiction fe ll afoul of the rule that a judgment winner lacks standing to appeal. See DE"\ /, iti g ation, 7 F.3d at 23. 
Judge Weinstein has said about DES Casfs:
Recently, I had an opportunity to employ some of my views on jurisdiction, acquired while working with the law school classes I taught on mass torts. In In re DES Cases, I took a position that was inconsistent with recent Supreme Court opinions, though not, I thought, with underlying principles. that is a cost of the rule of law. He seeks the "freedom of law professors to overrule the [Supreme] Court."1 0 6
Finally on the subject of taking responsibility fo r judicial disobedi ence, another recent case-United States v. Londono-suggests that Judge Weinstein has difficulty distinguishing between the ordinary and the ex traordinary. 107 It also reveals the extent of his ingenuity in insulating the results of his work, if not the reasoning behind them, from appellate scru tiny. The judge's eloquently and persuasively stated objections to the Sentencing Guidelines are well known. Indeed, he has used the effo rt by unnamed judges "to escape the rigors of guideline sentencing" 1 0 8 as one specific example of judicial nullification.
Ye t, one must wonder whether concern fo r the supposed infertility problems of a convicted defendant is sufficient reason to confect a sen tence that not only flouts the Sentencing Guidelines but seems calculated to take the defendant outside of th e jurisdiction (through court-ordered deportation) before there can be appellate review. 109 As a result of this case, even one who agrees with Judge Weinstein's 1988 article disputing the power of a court of appeals to order that a case be assigned to an other trial judge on remand 1 10 can better understand the opposmg view. Weinstein is a very bright, learned, and self-assured person-brighter, more learned, and more self-assured than all but a handful of the Article III judges who sit, or could conceivably sit, in review of his work. His assertion that "[n]o fe deral judge worth his salt cares about a reversal, because he invariably knows in his heart that he was right and the higher court wrong," 112 therefore rings true to a scholarly audience, which was the audience he was addressing. But the remark was not seriously in tended 11 1 and, in any event, is hard to square with Judge Weinstein's at tempts to avoid appellate review, if not with his judge-centered theory of 106. Burbank, supra note 2, at 660; see also supra text accompanying note 2. 107. 100 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1996 Ill. In Londono, the Court of Appeals directed that "further proceedings be assigned to a different judge," 100 F.3d at 242, noting that the "district court's handling of this case has several troubling aspects," id., and "makes an exorbitant claim on appellate resources." Id. at 243.
Londono surely made even more delicious th e recent opportunity Judge Weinstein had, and took, to demonstrate that a reduced sentence ordered by the Court of Appeals, although "desirable as a matter of policy and fa irness," was the result of a "technique and rationale . Judge Weinstein's theory of independence, according to which every fe deral judge is accountable "to the people and [his or her] conscience through the Constitution," 11 5 seems to leave little room fo r fo rmal institu tional responses to the misconduct of a fe deral judge. Or so I interpret Judge Weinstein's assertion that 1980 legislation11 6 that was designed to provide a supplement to the impeachment process within the judici ary, 117 was "in large part unconstitutional."1 18 In matters pertaining to judicial accountability, Judge Weinstein is a strict constructionist, parsing statutes and denying claims of the inherent power of appellate courts in a fashion and with an attitude quite different from that which characterizes his own exercises of power.
19
Indeed, although Judge Weinstein has acknowledged that effective appellate review is necessary to prevent '"judicial despotism, " '12 0 in re cent years he appears to have come to regard courts of appeals as sources of "outside interference," or worse, "th reats to the independence of fe d-
But I regret to say that the titles of scholar and judge are incompatible. Judges cannot be scholars. If they were to try, as a scholar would, to understand the fu ll complexity of every case, their decisions would never be timely. All that work-a-day judges like myself can do is to mingle whenever possible with scholars and students like yourselves in the hope that some of your knowledge and insight v.-i ll rub off. No fe deral judge worth his salt cares about a reversal, because he invariably knows in his heart that he was right and the higher court wrong. But when a law review article or student note says he was mistaken, then he worries. eral trial judges." That is, in any event, how he recently characterized interlocutory appeals, lumping them with th e practice of ordering reas signment on remand . 12 1
II. IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
vVh at accounts fo r these problematic aspects of th e work of a great judge? The record, like the man, is too complex to affo rd an easy answer or perhaps any answer that will gain wide assent. Even if I am correct that Judge Weinstein remains Professor Weinstein in his approach to ques tions of independence and accountability, that is an insufficiently nour ishing account of the behavior in question. I therefore consider norma tive justifications of a judge-centered approach to independence that Judge Weinstein himself has offered. I also consider explanations that are suggested by, but that may ultimately confound, the economic theory of judicial behavior.
A. Imagination (Power)
Trial judges have much to learn fr om [William] James. With his marked poetic insight, which made him the despair of sedate, "classical," psychologists, he went far in exploring the jungles of the human mind. Judging, especially in trial courts, calls fo r such poetic insight. For poetry, which involves synthetic imagination, gives "an inclusive understanding of situations" in a way that "analytic reason" cannot. 1 22 Academics tend to prize creativity more than they do learning, and they prize most of all th e two in combination. When Jack Weinstein was a professor, academic law was a recognizable discipline; its orientation was doctrinal, and if only because of that orientation, scholars who could de ploy their creativity and learning in directions that were thought to have practical payoffs were especially esteemed. Professor Weinstein was such a scholar. noted th e danger "that the shift of responsibility upward will reduce the prestige of the lower courts and lead to a failure to assume responsibility by trial judges in cases in which they should face up to hard decisions." ld.
122. Frank, supra note 4, at 397 (footnotes omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 4.
[Vol. 97:1971 judge. In only fifteen years1 24 he became one of the country's fo remost scholars in both civil procedure and evidence and in his spare time helped to solve New York's motor vehicle problems, 1 2 5 rewrote New York's Civil Practice Act, 1 2 6 and started work on the first comprehensive reform of the law of evidence in the United States.1 2 7
Re presentative of Professor Weinstein's scholarship in this period is a 1961 article he published on bifurcation of jury negligence trials. 1 2 s The article is striking because Weinstein was so far ahead of most of his contemporaries in recognizing, and seriously engaging, the substantive impact of procedure and its implications fo r court rulemaking. It is also noteworthy because it reflects the fruits of rare commodities (in 1961 or 1997) ,129 comparative civil procedure no and the use of empirical data. 1 " 1 Like his other work, the article reveals a powerful and restless mind at work, refusing to be cabined by either conventional wisdom or conven tional techniques.
Skip fr om 1961 to 1997, and fr om the work of Professor Weinstein to the work of Judge Weinstein. Presiding over related civil and criminal fraud cases, Judge Weinstein used "an integrated civil settlement and a criminal restitution order ... to assure maximum recovery by th e victims with minimum transactional costs."\'02 Although the Judge asserted that " [ c] ombining criminal and civil proceedings, or aspects of those proceed ings, is not novel," the references in support of that proposition are to articles discussing th e procedural systems of Sweden and France.'"" That is because th e idea fo r the procedure Judge Weinstein devised was "sparked in part" by an international conference on comparative civil jus- tice reform th at he had attended in Florence in 1996.134 But the Judge also brought to bear on the problem his extraordinary experience in, and his perspectives on, class actions, conducting proceedings th at could be "likened to Rule 23 fa irness hearings ... not only to inform the court, but to assure th e victims (many of whom were unaware of the workings of the American justice system) that they were being treated fa irly."133 Not content to implement a strikingly innovative approach inspired in part by his fo rays am ong scholars, Judge Weinstein, ever th e scholar himself, identified potential "unnecessary problems and possible injus tices" in the coordinated conduct of civil and criminal proceedings. 1 36 All of this in an opinion of eight double-spaced pages ! For Judge Weinstein, as fo r Professor Weinstein, a ma jor value of independence-academic and judicial-inheres in th e "latitude fo r ex perimentation" it affords . 1 37 It is this quality that prompted him to liken the courtroom to a classroom.1 3 8 According to this view, both legal pro gress and the capacity to attract to the bench intelligent and creative peo ple require that individual judges not fe el that they are "straightjacketed by the current consensus interpretation of ambiguous national rules.''l:�9 It is, in other \Vords, a vi ew that essentially equates independence with discretion, and hence wi th power, 140 and imputes to it values that relate both to legal development and to the utility fu nction of judges:
The reality is that judicial and administrative discretion pervade our system at all levels. Such flexibility invites creativity, stimu lates innovation, and in good measure is responsible fo r th e at traction th at law holds fo r our brightest young minds. To th e public, however, it is undoubtedly a source of frustration and cynicism. 1 4 1 This bears some resemblance to Judge Posner's explanation of the reasons why 'j udges adhere to stare decisis but not rigidly," 1 ·1:! an explana tion that is, however, ultimately unsatisfying:
[I]f th ere is no fe lt choice, there is no pleasure in choosing. That may be why so many district judges held the fe deral sen- tencing guidelines unconstitutional . They believed that the gu idelines would turn criminal sentencing, fo rmerly an area of almost unlimited district-j udge discretion, into a process of mechanical, but labori ous, computation. 1 43
The notion that power is important to an understanding of judicial be havior is not restricted to those who take an economic approach to law. 144 But judge Posner has provided an interesting summary of recent work th at analyzes judges' power "as a source of satisfaction, or even of exhilaration, akin to that experienced by creative people."1 45 His discus sion suggests that just as "[a] rtists impose their aesthetic vision on soci ety[,] judges impose their political vision on society." 1 4 6 Judge Posner's application of economic theory to the judiciary, and th e literature on which he relies, 1 47 are primarily concerned with appel late (collegial) courts. It is this fo cus that leads to his assertion that judges impose "their political vision on society ... mainly through the precedential fo rce of their decisions, since a single decision rarely has a great impact."14s And the same fo cus suggests a "trade-off between the loss of power that results fr om judges' fo llowing their predecessors' deci sions rather than innovating and the loss of power that results if, by refus ing to fo llow their predecessors' decisions, ... they reduce the likelihood that th eir successors will fo llow their decisions."149
The calculus is different fo r trial judges, particularly in the age of managerial judging, aggregation, and settlement.150 If Agent Orange has taught us-and that includes Judge Weinstein-anything, it is that single "litigations," 1 " 1 if not single decision � , can have a great impact indeed. :V Ioreover, trial judges bent on maximizing their power are not likely to 150. See generally Resnik, supra note 74 (assessing increased power of trial judges t·esulting from pretrial managerial judging, which is rarely reviewable); Yeazell, supra note 56 (contending that trial courts are equipped wi th increasingly extensive procedural tools, yet appellate courts have not accordingly increased their supervisory powers).
151. "My practice is generally to concentrate on litigations." Letter from .Jack B.
\,\.einstein to Stephen B. Burbank Uune 11, 1996) (copy on file with the Columbia Law Re\iew) .
pause long over the trade-off posited in Judge Posner's discussion, if they perceive it as applicable to them at all. Finally, it seems equally true of trial as of appellate judges that, although criticism for flouting precedent is a cost, it "may well be outweighed by the gain ... from changing policy in the direction [the judge] desires."15 2
The theory that treats judges' power "as a source of satisfaction, or even of exhilaration, akin to that experienced by creative people,"153 may have some explanatory fo rce when applied to the work of Jack Weinstein. Not only is that theory consistent with a number of his own statements about the judicial fu nction, it also helps to explain behavior of Judge Weinstein that is otherwise puzzling.
I have noted that Judge Weinstein does not always distinguish ordi nary from extraordinary cases fo r the purpose of judicial disobedience or nullificationY"4 Professor Mullenix has seen in Judge Weinstein's at tempt to assimilate mass tort litigation to public law litigation the desire to "intervene assertively in mass tort cases to impose court-ordered solu tions, just as he did in school desegregation and mental health cases." 1c '5 Both phenomena may reflect the desire to maximize opportunities fo r judicial behavior that is itself extraordinary and that affo rds extraordinary satisfaction.
This seems a more plausible explanation of Judge Weinstein's at tempts to consolidate stress disorder cases than the efficiency rationale he offered after he was reversed by the Court of Appeals.15 6 For, as the Court of Appeals suggested, mass torts can become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" 157 at the hands of a judge fo r whom the intellectual challenges of complexity may sometimes obscure its costs. 155. Mullenix, supra note 4, at 580; see also id. at 581-82 (comparing mass torts with "public law" constitutional litigation of the 1960s) .
156. Case by case disposition seems to me to be unsuitable fo r what may be many thousands of stress disorder cases. . . . The Court of Appeals has not. in my opinion, sufficiently considered the efficiency of having one decision on the science issues instead of, as in Bendectin, many decisions by trial and appellate courts all over the country. Expenses to plaintiffs are increased since each must pay a substantial filing fe e. Co ntrol of discovery by many magistrate judges instead of one is duplicative and less effective; the work of many judges and magistrate judges is needed to control discovery. 157. In re Repetitive Stress In jury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 374 (2cl Cir. 1993).
158. See generally Burbank, supra note 86 (discussing costs of complex litigation).
The possibility that Judge Weinstein's utility fu nction drives him to seek (or create) the extraordinary in preference to the ordinary-"litiga tions" rather than cases-may also help to explain apparent inconsisten cies that are surprising in one so intelligent and so pragmatic. Professor Schuck discussed inconsistencies between the Judge's treatment of indi vidual (opt-out) plaintiffs and members of the class in Agent Orange, which included letting th e individuals suffe r "premature dismissal" that the Judge had recognized as problematic fo r the class.">9 Judge We instein also is not consistent in that he fails to recognize that, just as premature aggregation in a class action may seriously prejudice the ability of those who have been injured to establish a right to recover under the governing substantive law, so may other fo rms of aggregation, such as consolidation. 1 6 0
It cannot be, however, that Judge Weinstein's judge-centered theory of independence and accountability reflects only the Judge's desire to exercise power in order to maximize purely personal satisfaction. Nor is th at the only possible interpretation of Judge Posner's discussion of the economic analysis of judicial behavior. Recall that the satisfaction or ex hilaration he posited derived fr om 'judges impos [ing] their political vi sion on society." 1 6 1 This suggests that we should also consider whether ideology plays a part in Judge Weinstein's approach to his role as a fe deral judge. In doing so, we may be led to agree with Professor Geyh 's critique of public choice theory. As he points out, "self-interest explains judicial conduct only if self-i nterest is defined broadly to account fo r other oriented behavior. With such a definition, however, the public choice model becomes tautological and explains nothing." 1 6:2
B. Ideolog)'
Because there are so many ordinary judges, and because anti-intellectualism, democratic egalitarianism, and suspicion of officials run deep in th e American soul, th ere is even a cult of ordinariness in judging. Exceptionally able judges arouse suspi cion of havi ng an "agenda," that is, of wanting to be something more than just corks bobbing on the waves of litigation or umpires calling balls and strikes. Some judges have had political agendas, but there is no correlation betwe en being exception ally able and having such an agenda. 163. Posner, supra note 4, at II 0.
Having previously described the way in which Judge ·weinstein painted "the personality of our legal system" 1 64 as a "combination of per sonal politics and wishful thinking," 1 65 and being anxious to avoid misun derstanding, I should define my terms. 166 Judges are bound to have be liefs about both th e appropriate role of, and appropriate policies or goals fo r, government, some of which they are bound to translate into law. That is not only because judges are human.1 6 7 It results as well fr om the fa ct that in our system "the line betw·een law and policy ... is blurred [because] [m] any cases cannot be decided by reasoning from conven ti onal legal materials [and] [s] uch cases require the judge to exercise a legislative judgment." l 6 S A judge 's political beliefs , his or her policy preferences, should not cause concern unless they hold sway with such power as to be impervious to adjudicative fa cts, competing policies, or the governing law as it is gen erally understood. When an individual's belief system about social needs or aspirations is that powerful, it seems fa ir to speak of ideology. 16 9 An d on this understanding, ideology is revealed as the enemy of judicial independence. 1 7 0
One way an individual judge's policy preferences can be, or can be come, "impervious" to law is th rough nullification. We should, therefore, consider whether conflicts in recent years between Judge Weinstein and the Court of Appeals turn on matters not of independence but of ideol ogy. That seems a possible interpretation of his attempts to insulate from appellate review his work in Agent Or ange and other cases, at least if one also credits his statements about appellate review as a necessary check on 164. Weinstein, Fiftieth Anniversary, supra note 6, at 29. 165. Burbank, supra note 7, at 32-33. 166. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 836 ("A definition is in fa ct a type of insurance against certain risks of confusion.").
167. vVh en all is said and done, we must fa ce the fact that judges are human.
That should not dismay those of us who cherish democracy. For in a democracy it is imperative never to fo rget that public offices are, of necessity, held by mere men, who, of course, have human fo ibles. It is only where government officials are deemed to be semi-divine that people have any excuse for ignoring the ineluctable personal fa ctor in government.
Frank, supra note 4, at 410 (footnote omitted).
168. My study of Jack Weinstein's work suggests that there are three ideas that exercise a consistently powerful influence on his judicial behavior, so powerfu l that they may at times lead him to neglect competing policies or to depart from the law as it is generally understood, and in that sense may be thought ideological. These three ideas-access, communication, and empathy-are related, perhaps interdependent.
Access. -
The erection of barriers to court access under the guise of procedural efficiency seems misguided and shortsighted: it will burden the weak and the aggrieved unfairly, and it ultimately will undermine the legitimacy of the legal system which most of th ese "reformers" hold dear. 173
Judge Weinstein has a passionate commitment to access to the courts fo r those who are aggrieved, a commitment consistently reflected in his decisions as a judge and in his extrajudicial wri tings. It was alertness to this value that led him to refuse to apply a state ethical rule on responsi bility fo r the costs of litigation when doing so would impede the purposes of the fe deral class action rule.174 It was in part concern about access fo r those seeking to assert state law claims that influenced his opinion on fe deral preemption under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Roden ticide Act (FIFRA) .175 And he has voiced a similar concern about access in response to appellate decisions restricting the ability of fe deral district judges to I share Judge Weinstein's commitment to preserving access to the courts fo r those who are aggrieved and his discomfort with experiments to restrict court access that may themselves be the product of ideology.1 77 I also acknowledge that, taking a broader view of the fe deral court system today, some may regard his effo rts to ensure access fo r those who fe el aggrieved as, if not a cry in the wilderness, then a brave attempt to stem a tide of heartlessness and greed masquerading as efficiency. Nonetheless, I worry th at Judge Weinstein may be insufficiently attentive to ( 1) the problems that defendants may confront in achieving effective access to the judicial process at the trial level and to (2) the fact that access should include access to appellate review.
Judicial disobedience in promoting, and subsequently insulating fr om appellate review, 1 78 judicially confected and brokered settlements is hard to square with a commitment to access fo r all. A recent decision by Judge Weinstein and judge Baer, coordinating the management of breast implant cases in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, raises a similar concern. 179 They refused to grant a defense motion fo r summary judgment as to some (the most serious) plaintiffs ' claims, which were ad mittedly not adequately supported, on the ground that scientific evidence might be fo rthcoming to shore them up. At the same time, and over defendants' objection, they severed fo r trial other claims fo r which ade quate proof might be available. 180
Many years ago, Judge Weinstein wrote that " [ c] lass actions favor plaintiffs . There is no doubt about it."181 Yet, as Professor Yeazell has demonstrated, that has not always been true, and recent developments in class action practice, together with recently proposed amendments to Rule 23, reveal the potential of the class action to favor defendants as well.182 As Professor Yeazell also notes, th ese developments may augur genuine procedural neutrality. 1 H 3 I recognize, of course, that many plaintiffs confront more substantial obstacles to court access than do many defendants. But "many" is not all. In any event, as I have argued elsewhere, "[n] either judges nor proce dural reformers have a general charter to reform society, and broad-scale 177. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1947-48 ("Theory is an irresponsible basis for lawmaking about something as important as access to court, and it is especially irresponsible when the lawmaking involves judicial amendment of a Rule [Rule 11] that, in part because of access concerns, only barely escaped the bright light of the democratic process."). social reform would be necessary to eradicate the non-neutral effe cts of many, and perhaps most, procedural rules."1 8 4 "Procedural camouflage " 1 85 can be used to broaden, as well as to restrict, access, and I agree with Judge Weinstein that " [ t] he public is entitled to be aware of and participate in the law reform process."18 6 Wh en the law in question is not a court rule, but rather judge-made law, participation requires effective access to the judicial process fo r all parties and proceedings that are open to the public.187 The "legitimacy of the legal system " 1 88 is equally at stake.
Finally, if we are concerned about the effect of inequality of re sources as between plaintiffs (and/or their agents) and defendants (and/ or their agents) on access to court, as pragmatists we should also be con cerned about the possible results of the same inequality on access to the legislature in effecting civil justice reform . The concern is that a per ceived tilt by the courts toward plaintiffs may lead to legislation that blocks or seriously impedes access to court. As the Private Securities Liti gation Reform Act of 1995 189 demonstrates, perception in Washington does not depend upon fa cts.1 90
Communication. -
The judge should, it is submitted, expose himself or herself on a person-to-person basis to the emotional and other needs of the litigants . This proposition requires a shift fr om the traditional An glo-American jurisprudential view that the common law judge is an oracle on high, muffled in the black robe of anonym ity, uttering the law and deciding the facts without involvement. 1 9 1
Communication is instrumental to judge Weinstein's commitment to access fo r those who are aggrieved. He reaches out to hear from, and thus better understand the interests and concerns of, those who may be affe cted by judicial action. In so reaching out, Judge Weinstein serves both the dignity and participation values of litigation 1 92 and, ultimately, the legitimacy of legal institutions.193
The rules of procedure provide a structured process fo r communica ti ons among the parties and the court. They also recognize the impor tance in some situations of participation by those who are not fo rmally before the court, 194 and in class actions, give the judge affirmative re sponsibility to provide them with an opportunity to be heard.195 With the advent of structural reform litigation has come a rich literature on both the need fo r the judge to transcend the traditional umpireal role and the difficulty of devising standards to guide the judge when fashioning, or considering a proposed, decree. 1 96
Structural reform litigation and class actions are the exception, even if they garner a disproportionate amount of scholarly (and judicial ) atten ti on. But there is also a rich empirical literature on the experience of those who have been involved in dispute resolution processes, which indi cates that fo r many people, satisfaction lies less in wi nning than in being fa irly heard. 1 97 Thus, in reaching out to those ;vho may be affected by the decisions he makes, in ordinary and extraordinary cases alike, Judge Weinstein has again been ahead of many of his colleagues, and fo r that matter of much of the profession.
Hmvever, just as communication is essential to Judge Weinstein's conception of access, so is it subject to the test of evenhandedness. Civil defendants have needs and concerns too, and they may have employees and stockholders to worry about. 19s We should not assume that agency problems involving communication between lawyer and client are always greater fo r plaintiffs than defendants. 199 It thus may be a mistake fo r a "communicatarian" 2 00 to rely on defense lawyers to bring before the court all relevant perspectives in support of their legal contentions.
Moreover, when a judge reaches out to litigants in nontraditional ways, he risks misperception that can sabotage the admirable goal of us ing communication to fo ster the public's views about the legitimacy of the system. Those whose interests are opposed to the individuals or groups to whom the judge reaches out may equate communicati on with influence and come to believe that they have not been fairly treated.
Judge Weinstein created such problems a few years ago when he met on fo ur occasions, on the record, with persons who claimed to have been injured by DES and their lawyers, a meeting at which, in the Judge's words, "[t]he women recounted tragic stories of how DES had affected their lives."2 01 In denying a motion to disqualify himself in the case of one of the women with whom he had met, Judge Weinstein explained that at the time he had been serving "in [a] settlement role," 2 0 2 and that it was then unknown that she would become a plaintiff in a case before him. Vigorously defending the "need fo r the court to communicate with the parties,"203 the Judge distinguished empathy and lack of impartial ity,204 pointing out that in the meetings he had "noted the importance of giving due process to both plaintiff and defendant drug companies" and that "[i] n the course of these settlement discussions, the court became fully aware of the contentions of all parties."2°5 Even if Judge Weinstein was technically correct in refusing to dis qualify himself in this case, a reader of his opinion may not attribute the defense motion to purely strategic behavior, as in so many such situa tions. For most litigants, expressions of sympathy and compassion fo r an adversary, given by the judge in a private meeting, suggest a disposition in that person's favor. Neither the existence of a record nor abstract bilat eral references to due process and the parties' "contentions" are likely to dispel that impression . 2°6
In denying the disqualification motion, Judge Weinstein relied on the fact that when he held the meetings in question, he was cooperating with a New York judge in an effo rt to settle New York state court DES cases. He justified the denial on the ground that quite different norms of judicial behavior are appropriate in the settlement role. 2 07
The problems that active judicial involvement in settlement can pose fo r the parties and the judge in ordinary litigation include role confu sion. 2 08 The party that moved to disqualify Judge Weinstein may be fo r given fo r confusion about the role of an Article III judge in seeking to assist in the settlement of state court cases. Indeed, Judge Weinstein him self seems confused about that role, since his subsequent, extrajudicial, descriptions of the meetings that led to the disqualification motion sug gest that they occurred after the participants ' cases settled . 2 0 9
Finally, attention to nontraditional fo rms of judicial communication should not obscure the fact that the traditional fo rm of communication fo r a litigant who is aggrieved by an action of the trial court is an appeaJ. 2 1o 3. Empathy. -
The problem of empathy versus impartiality is not an easy one to resolve. Even in a medical model, empathy may be dangerous since subjectivity may interfere with dispassionate analysis and good judgment. The problems may be more difficult in the legal setting. Nevertheless, we must consider parting from a traditional mode J . 2 11
As a professor, Jack \Veinstein expressed the view that "[t]he best judges depend fa r more on experience, ability, warmth of spirit, and com passion than they do on procedure ." 2 1 2 As a judge, he has consistently maintained that "[w] ithout the ameliorating effect of a sensitivity to the needs of others, th e law fu nctions as a rapacious machine whose imparti ality will ultimately consume us all . ": n3 Whether in handling social secur ity disability appeals or in handling Agent Orange, Judge 'Weinstein has COL UlvJBIA LAW RE 1/JEW [Vol. 97: 1971 fo llowed Jerome Frank's refusal to accept ir-Uustice.21 4 He has not yet, however, provided the answer Frank was looking fo r when he asked "why our judges must continue to do merciful justice by stealth . " 2 1 0 Judge Weinstein's commitments to access and communication en able him to maximize opportunities fo r empathy with those who are ag grieved, and the benefits and costs of his empathy are linked to, or re fl ect, the benefits and costs of those other two commitments. Expressions of empathy by a judge humanize what can be a bewildering and dehu manizing process and may help even those who are not successful in the legal process to fe el that th ey have been fairly treated. 2 16 Moreover, the capacity to experience and express empathy may well be important to a judge 's performance, by enhancing not only that individual's personal satisfaction but also his or her creative contributions to the law.
There can be little doubt that Judge Weinstein's empathy fo r those who are aggrieved, whose access to the judicial process he has facilitated by enabling aggregation, and to whom he has reached out in communica tion, has caused him at times to depart from the law as it is generally understood. Thus, Judge Weinstein was "struck by the deep emotional underpinnings of the [Agent Orange] litigation .''217 Although he recog nized that the ''science did not support a viable cause of action," he could not fo r that reason "ignor[e] those cries fro m the heart fo r justice. "21 R Indeed, his empathy for various communities of plaintiffs involved in mass tort litigation-from asbestos, to Age nt Orange, to DES, to the Dalkon Shield-sometimes causes him to regard them all as "tort vic ti ms," even though some of them, as he admits, cannot recover under the existing substantive law.2'9
From this perspective, empathy is critical to judge Weinstein's depar tures from the law as it is generally understood, informing the "felt sense of appropriateness" to which he has referred.221l It helps to explain, although it renders no less subjective, a principle or standard that "turns on the individual judge's ... sympathies or 'sense ofjustice. ' " 2 21 More over, it may suggest that the dichotomy between independence and ideol ogy in the work of Jack We instein is false, because independence of a type is in fa ct the Judge's overriding ideology.
214. See Fran k, supra note 4, at 389 (".'viercy, charity, compassionateness, respect fo r the unique attributes of the men and women who come before our trial courts ... would seem to be needed components of a civilized judicial process.") .
215. Id Ronald Dworkin has suggested that "the conventional, instrumental defense of academic fr eedom" is insufficient, arguing that invasions of academic fr eedom offe nd an "ideal of ethical individualism" that is val ued not just by academics but also by society. 222 This ideal imposes on professors "an undiluted responsibility to the truth, and it is, in that way, the closest a professional responsibility can come to the fu ndamental eth ical responsibility each of us has, according to the ideals of ethical indi vidualism, to live our lives m accordance with our own fe lt convictions. " 22 3
Judge Weinstein has spent a great deal of time in recent years grap pling with the ethical issues of those involved in mass tort litigation, in cludingjudges. 22 4 Lacking clear and generally accepted ethical standards to use in considering departures fr om the law, 22 5 and relying on his sense of responsibility "to the people and [his] conscience through the Consti tution," 226 Judge Weinstein lives Dworkin's ethical individualism as a judge, having lived it as a professor.
CoNCLUSION
It has been a privilege to engage the work, judicial and extrajudicial, of a person as bright, creative and committed to the highest ideals of our profession as Jack Weinstein, and equally a privilege to seek to under stand and explain the influences that contribute to the judicial behavior of such a complex person. I am sure that I have done neither those influ ences nor Judge We instein justice.
For me both the bad news and the good are that Jack Weinstein is unique. The news is bad, because judges with any of his distinguishing qualities-his intellectual power, capacity fo r pragmatic innovation, and, yes, capacity fo r empathy-are rare. As our elected representatives leave (or commit) more of society's pressing problems to the courts , we shall The challenge of ethics in mass tort cases can be met in either of two ways: we can fashion a new set of positive rules to apply in these cases, or we can institutionalize a practice of granting "variances," allowing workable relief from the ordinary operation of the positive law. In either case, we first must fi nd a set of ethical principles to guide our selection of the rules or exceptions we wi ll apply in practice. Id. at 46 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 171 ("Ethical and legal norms out of touch wi th real life lead not to morality, but to hypocrisy, abuse, and waste.").
225. See supra text accompanying notes 71-80. 226. See Weinstein, Nazis, supra note 57, at 1154; supra text accompanying notes 78, 115. Judge Weinstein believes that "the high est traditions of humanity and personal responsibility ... ought to characterize our office." We instein, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 143, at 366.
[Vol. 97:1971 need, and shall surely have difficulty finding, more judges with those qualities.
The news is good, but only in a perverse sense. We are hypocrites, refusing to give the courts the tools they reasonably need to solve the problems left (or committed) to their care, but insisting on the ideal-or is it the ideology-of the rule of law.227 But insist we must in order to preserve a system that, although grossly imperfe ct, still seems preferable to the alternatives.
The American Bar Association established a Commission on Separa tion of Powers and Judicial Independence, the immediate animating fo rce behind which seems to have been attacks on the judiciary by mem bers of the political branches.228 While the ABA Commission was deliber ating, reports from Washington suggested that 'j udicial activism" was high on the agenda of members of both houses of Congress, some of whom apparently believe that impeachment is, after all, a suitable vehicle fo r the expression of profound disagreement with the substance of judi cial decisions. 229 One migh t respond to these critics of the fe deral judiciary that the real problem is "legislative activism," in the sense of kneejerk political responses to serious social problems, many of which are then left in the lap of the courts.230 Or one might argue that the problem arises from "legislative paralysis,"-Congress's refusal both to do legislative work that needs to be done231 and to give the judiciary the means to do theirs. 232 Neither is an adequate response.
They are not adequate at the practical level because members of the political branches have different utility fu nctions than do federal judges, and the rules of the game they play,23 3 including their norms of account ability, do not put a high premium on rationality. When push comes to shove, they also hold most of the power, which is ultimately why the judi ciary is the "least dangerous" branch,234 and also the most vulnerable. That is why I believe that if judicial disobedience and refusal to accept institutional accountability were more prevalent, Judge Weinstein's most cherished professional possession-his independence-would be at risk, and with it, the independence of the fe deral judiciary.
They are not adequate at the normative level because fidelity to the rule of law in a democracy requires that, in the end, the judiciary abide irrationality and irresponsibility in the political branches, unless it is man ifested in behavior that the Constitution, fa irly interpreted, repre hends.235 "Abide" does not mean accept without question, or fo r that matter, wi thout insistence that legislative foolishness be clear fo r all to see. The need fo r more such questions-and answers-for a genuine di alogue among the three branches of the fe deral government, is urgent. 2?.6
Until that time, as always, the capacity of the judiciary to protect us fr om ourselves depends upon its institutional independence. And the maintenan ce of that precious gift fr om our fo refathers requires that, in Franklin's words, fe deral judges "hang together."237 Judges can be schol ars,238 and judge Weinstein remains one of our most interesting and pro vocative scholars on issues confronting the courts. But, as judges, they must surrender some of the intellectual autonomy of professors. That is one of the prices of donning a robe.
